Making war
Former Secretary of the Navy John Lehman here confronts one of the momentous issues of American history and the American present--the contending prerogatives of the president and Congress in making war. Lehman, a lively controversialist and scholar, examines the history of American military decision making from the Revolutionary period to the Gulf War. Whose power is it to declare war, to carry it out, and to sustain its course and bring it to an end? In addressing these major constitutional questions, Lehman is vibrantly contemporary, too, writing as a government insider to offer a exceptionally vivid perspective on Operation Desert Storm and recent military actions in Grenada, Libya, Lebanon, and Panama. Arguing vehemently for the primacy of presidential over congressional power, Lehman adds crucial new details to our understanding of the post-Vietnam era of American politics. Characteristically, Lehman pulls no punches. He sheds provocative new light on congressional investigations into Watergate and Iran-Contra, authoritatively demonstrating the ways in which Congress has created crippling impediments to presidential power. Yet he provides a fresh understanding of the essential role Congress must play in committing the nation to war, and he enumerates how presidents from Jefferson to Bush have interpreted--and misinterpreted--the powers grated them as commander in chief. John Lehman's enlightening new book makes a invaluable contribution as to whether responsible judgments will be made if and when the nation must again confront the crucial decision of making war.
