A Danger to Constitutional Government
Edición de la obra Unitary Executive Theory
| Autor | Jeffrey P. Crouch, Mark J. Rozell, A01 |
|---|---|
| Editorial | University Press of Kansas |
| Fecha de publicación | 2020 |
| Idioma | inglés |
| Páginas | 216 |
| ISBN-13 | 9780700630035 |
| OCLC | 1149159595 |
| LCCN | 2020011788 |
| Número de Cutter | C952u |
"In July 2019, President Donald J. Trump claimed at a student summit that the Constitution's Article II means "I have the right to do whatever I want as president." While such a statement would have shocked the Framers of the Constitution, it represents the working assumption of most modern presidents and has been given scholarly articulation over the past thirty years in what is known as the unitary executive theory. Proponents of this theory believe in a strong, vigorous presidency endowed with various unilateral powers. They think that the president controls any and all constitutional executive functions, and that Congress cannot check the president when exercising executive powers. The theory emerged in a weak form under the Reagan administration and in a stronger form under George W. Bush, and the Trump presidency represents its logical extension. Jeffrey Crouch, Mark J. Rozell, and Mitchel A. Sollenberger argue that the unitary executive theory stands in opposition to the Constitution and serves to justify presidential actions that violate the constitutional principles of separated powers and checks and balances. In this study, they explore the history of the theory's emergence and examine the chief executive's domestic and foreign affairs powers to show that the president does not exercise unitary control, despite the erosion of constitutional limits. While advocates of the theory argue that greater presidential power will make government more efficient, the results have shown otherwise. The Unitary Executive offers a much-needed primer on presidential power and presents a robust case for the return to our constitutional limits"--