Two-Sided Matching

A Study in Game-Theoretic Modeling and Analysis

Edición de la obra Two-Sided Matching

Winner of the Operations Research Society of America Lanchester Award, Two-Sided Matching provides a comprehensive account of recent results concerning the game-theoretic analysis of two-sided matching such as between firms and workers in labor markets, and between buyers and sellers in auctions. The book begins with a discussion of empirical results concerning behavior in such markets, and then proceeds to analyze a variety of related models. Among the discrete and continuous models considered are those with complete or incomplete information, money or barter, single or multiple workers, and simple or complex preferences. The book examines the stability of outcomes, the modification of incentives to agents under different organizational rules, and the constraints imposed on market organization by the incentives. Using this wide range of related models and matching situations helps clarify which conclusions are robust and which depend on particular modeling assumptions. --back cover