Trust and bribery
The role of the quid pro quo and the link with crime
Edición de la obra Trust and bribery
| Autor | Jennifer Hunt |
|---|---|
| Editorial | National Bureau of Economic Research |
| Fecha de publicación | 2004 |
| Lugar | Cambridge, MA |
| Idioma | inglés |
| Formato | Electronic resource |
| LCCN | 2005615137 |
| Serie | NBER working paper series ; · working paper 10510 · Working paper series (National Bureau of Economic Research : Online) ; |
| Número de Cutter | H941t |
"I study data on bribes actually paid by individuals to public officials, viewing the results through a theoretical lens that considers the implications of trust networks. A bond of trust may permit an implicit quid pro quo to substitute for a bribe, which reduces corruption. Appropriate networks are more easily established in small towns, by long-term residents of areas with many other long-term residents, and by individuals in regions with many residents their own age. I confirm that the prevalence of bribery is lower under these circumstances, using the International Crime Victim Surveys. I also find that older people, who have had time to develop a network, bribe less. These results highlight the uphill nature of the battle against corruption faced by policy-makers in rapidly urbanizing countries with high fertility. I show that victims of (other) crimes bribe all types of public officials more than non-victims, and argue that both their victimization and bribery stem from a distrustful environment"--National Bureau of Economic Research web site.