Tipping climate negotiations
Edición de la obra Tipping climate negotiations
| Autor | Geoffrey Heal |
|---|---|
| Editorial | National Bureau of Economic Research |
| Fecha de publicación | 2011 |
| Lugar | Cambridge, MA |
| Idioma | inglés |
| Formato | Electronic resource |
| LCCN | 2011657178 |
| Serie | NBER working paper series -- working paper 16954 · Working paper series (National Bureau of Economic Research : Online) -- working paper no. 16954. |
| Número de Cutter | H434t |
"Thinking about tipping provides a novel perspective on finding a way forward in climate negotiations and suggests an alternative to the current framework of negotiating a global agreement on reductions in greenhouse gas emissions. Recent work on non-cooperative games shows games with increasing differences have multiple equilibria and have a "tipping set," a subset of agents who by changing from the inefficient to the efficient equilibrium can induce all others to do the same. We argue that international climate negotiations may form such a game and so have a tipping set. This set is a small group of countries who by adopting climate control measures can make in the interests of all others to do likewise"--National Bureau of Economic Research web site.