Testing a purportedly more learnable auction mechanism
Edición de la obra Testing a purportedly more learnable auction mechanism
| Autor | Katherine L. Milkman |
|---|---|
| Editorial | Harvard Business School |
| Fecha de publicación | 2008 |
| Lugar | Boston] |
| Idioma | inglés |
| Páginas | 37 |
| OCLC | 219450397 |
| Serie | Working paper / Harvard Business School -- 08-064 · Working paper (Harvard Business School) -- 08-064 |
| Número de Cutter | M644t |
We describe an auction mechanism in the class of Groves mechanisms that has received attention in the computer science literature because of its theoretical property of being more "learnable" than the standard second price auction mechanism. We bring this mechanism, which we refer to as the "clamped second price auction mechanism," into the laboratory to determine whether it helps human subjects learn to play their optimal strategy faster than the standard second price auction mechanism.