Structuring and restructuring sovereign debt
the role of seniority
Edición de la obra Structuring and restructuring sovereign debt
| Autor | Patrick Bolton |
|---|---|
| Editorial | National Bureau of Economic Research |
| Fecha de publicación | 2005 |
| Lugar | Cambridge, MA |
| Idioma | inglés |
| Formato | Electronic resource |
| LCCN | 2005616200 |
| Serie | NBER working paper series ; · working paper 11071 · Working paper series (National Bureau of Economic Research : Online) ; |
| Número de Cutter | B694s |
"In an environment characterized by weak contractual enforcement, sovereign lenders can enhance the likelihood of repayment by making their claims more difficult to restructure. We show within a simple model how competition for repayment between lenders may result in sovereign debt that is excessively difficult to restructure in equilibrium. Alleviating this inefficiency requires a sovereign debt restructuring mechanism that fulfills some of the functions of corporate bankruptcy regimes, in particular the enforcement of seniority and subordination clauses in debt contracts"--National Bureau of Economic Research web site.