Strategic judicial decision making
Edición de la obra Strategic judicial decision making
| Autor | Pablo T. Spiller |
|---|---|
| Editorial | National Bureau of Economic Research |
| Fecha de publicación | 2007 |
| Lugar | Cambridge, Mass |
| Idioma | inglés |
| Páginas | 21 |
| OCLC | 171037785 |
| LCCN | 2007616463 |
| Serie | NBER working paper series -- no. 13321. · Working paper series (National Bureau of Economic Research) -- working paper no. 13321. |
| Número de Cutter | S756s |
This survey paper starts from the basic, and intuitive, assumption that judges are human and as such, can be modeled in the same fashion we model politicians, activists, managers: driven by well-defined preferences, behaving in a purposive and forward-looking fashion. We explore, then, the role politics play in judicial decision-making. We provide a brief overview of what is called the "strategic approach," compare it to alternative approaches to understand judicial behavior, and offer some concluding thoughts about the future of positive analyses of judicial decision-making.