Relational Subject

Edición de la obra Relational Subject

"Many social theorists now call themselves 'relational sociologists', but mean entirely different things by it. The majority endorse a 'flat ontology', dealing exclusively with dyadic relations. Consequently, they cannot explain the context in which relationships occur or their consequences, except as resultants of endless 'transactions'. This book adopts a different approach which regards 'the relation' itself as an emergent property, with internal causal effects upon its participants and external ones on others. The authors argue that most 'relationists' seem unaware that analytical philosophers, such as Searle, Gilbert and Tuomela, have spent years trying to conceptualize the 'We' as dependent upon shared intentionality. Donati and Archer change the focus away from 'We thinking' and argue that 'We-ness' derives from subjects' reflexive orientations towards the emergent relational 'goods' and 'evils' they themselves generate. Their approach could be called 'relational realism', though they suggest that realists, too, have failed to explore the 'relational subject'"-- "More and more social theorists are now calling themselves 'Relational Sociologists', but they mean entirely different things by this term. It can cover anything from reductionist methodological individualism to a form of holistic sociological imperialism that deems all our relations to be exclusively 'social'. The majority, however, endorse a 'flat ontology', dealing exclusively with dyadic relations. Consequently, they cannot explain the context in which relationships occur despite there being no such thing as context-less action. It also means that the outcomes of relationality can be explained only as the result of an endless series of 'transactions', whose aggregation would somehow account for social stability and change. The approach of this book is quite different, in regarding the 'the relation' itself as an emergent property, with internal causal effects upon its participants and external ones on others. A second difference is that many of these 'Relationists' appear unaware that analytical philosophers, such as John Searle, Margaret Gilbert and Raimo Tuomela, have spent twenty years trying to vindicate a concept of the 'We', that gives rise to commitment, cooperation and collective action; one that also generates deontic rights: obligations, rights, and duties. In this book, however, 'We-ness' is held to derive from subjects' reflexive orientations towards the emergent relational 'goods' and 'evils' they themselves generate - then affecting their actions in a couple, a work group, sport's team, orchestra, voluntary association or social movement. Both authors could be called 'Relational Realists', but we have something to offer to Realism too, which, despite its humanism, has failed to explore the 'Relational Subject'"--