President's Czars

Undermining Congress and the Constitution

Edición de la obra The President's Czars

The very word "czar" seems inappropriate in a constitutional republic, but it has come to describe any executive branch official who has significant authority over a policy area, works independently of agency or Department heads, and is not confirmed by the Senate -- or subject to congressional oversight. Mitchel Sollenberger and Mark Rozell provide the first comprehensive overview of presidential czars, tracing the history of the position from its origins through its initial expansion under FDR and its dramatic growth during the presidencies of George W. Bush and Barack Obama. The President's Czars shows how, under pressure to act on the policy front, modern presidents have increasingly turned to these appointed officials, even though by doing so they violate the Appointments Clause and can also run into conflict with the nondelegation doctrine and the principle that a president cannot unilaterally establish offices without legislative support. Further, Sollenberger and Rozell contend that czars not only are ill-conceived but also disrupt a governing system based on democratic accountability. A sobering overview solidly grounded in public law analysis, this study serves as a counter-argument to those who would embrace an excessively powerful presidency, one with relatively limited constraints. Among other things, it proposes the restoration of accountability -- starting with significant changes to Title 3 of the U.S. Code, which authorizes the president to appoint White House employees "without regard to any other provision of law." - Publisher.