Paying for long-term performance
Edición de la obra Paying for long-term performance
| Autor | Lucian A. Bebchuk |
|---|---|
| Editorial | Harvard Law School |
| Fecha de publicación | 2009 |
| Lugar | Cambridge, MA |
| Idioma | inglés |
| Formato | Electronic resource |
| LCCN | 2010655602 |
| Serie | Discussion paper -- no. 658 · Discussion paper (John M. Olin Center for Law, Economics, and Business : Online) -- no. 658. |
| Número de Cutter | B387p |
"Abstract: Firms and regulators around the world are now seeking to ensure that the compensation of public company executives is tied to long-term results to avoid creating incentives for excessive risk-taking. This paper analyzes how this objective can be best achieved. Focusing on equity-based compensation, the primary component of executive pay packages, we identify how such compensation could be best structured to tie remuneration to long-term results rather than short-term gains that might turn out to be illusory. We also analyze how equity compensation could be best designed to prevent the gaming of equity grants at either the front-end or the back-end"--John M. Olin Center for Law, Economics, and Business web site.