on the importance of consistency within Nietzsche's philosophy
Edición de la obra Metaphysics without truth
| Autor | Stefan Lorenz Sorgner |
|---|---|
| Editorial | Utz |
| Fecha de publicación | 1999 |
| Lugar | München |
| Idioma | inglés |
| Páginas | 164 |
| ISBN-10 | 3896755897 |
| OCLC | 44849864 |
| LCCN | 00432368 |
| Serie | Münchner philosophische Beiträge |
| Número de Cutter | S713m |
"Is there any good reason to believe in Nietzsche's metaphysics even though he himself claims that it is not "the truth" in correspondence with the world? According to Danto, Nietzsche's metaphysics is only valid for Nietzsche himself. However, this answer does not take into consideration Nietzsche's claim for the general superiority of his philosophy. Nietzsche's view seems inconsistent: on the one hand, he claimed all perspectives are equally false in respect to "the truth," but on the other, he regarded his views as superior. This book explains in which respect Nietzsche justifies his claims, that Nietzsche's position is not inconsistent, and why consistency is important for him."--Jacket.