Lee moves north

Robert E. Lee on the offensive

Edición de la obra Lee Moves North

Lee Moves North explains why a commander who won a spectacular success at Chancellorsville in May 1863 could suffer so terrible a defeat only two months later at Gettysburg. In analysis of Lee's generalship, Palmer forcefully argues that the celebrated leader had a penchant for hastily planned offensives undertaken with virtually no logistical preparation. Drawing on extensive documentation, including Lee's personal correspondence, Michael Palmer focuses on the crucial period between September 1862 and November 1863 - specifically, three decisive campaigns: the abortive Maryland invasion that ended at Sharpsburg, the landmark battle of Gettysburg, and the lesser-known Bristoe Station fiasco that came shortly thereafter. As he vividly recreates the battles and maneuvers, Palmer offers new interpretations of several hotly debated episodes, including J. E. B. "Jeb" Stuart's infamous ride around the Federal army during the Gettysburg campaign. Was the alternate plan outlined by Lee in fact unworkable? Lee Moves North reveals how the general's penchant for secrecy about his plans - a prerequisite for the political battle he waged with his superiors in Richmond - undermined the Army of Northern Virginia. Keeping his true intentions hidden from President Jefferson Davis and Secretary of War James Seddon meant also keeping the plans secret from even the army's trusted corps commanders. As a result, inadequate support, poor or nonexistent staff work, and confusion about campaign objectives all contributed to failure. In fact, Palmer's account demonstrates a direct correlation between the troubled relationship of Lee and Davis and the actual outcome on the battlefield.

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