Lessons for Afghanistan from Historical Insurgnecies That Have Been Resoved Through Negotiations
Edición de la obra From Stalemate to Settlement
| Autor | Colin P. Clarke, Christopher Paul |
|---|---|
| Editorial | Rand |
| Fecha de publicación | Feb 28, 2014 |
| Páginas | 92 |
| Formato | paperback |
| ISBN-13 | 9780833082374 |
| ISBN-10 | 083308237X |
| OCLC | 869825301 |
| LCCN | 2014004479, 2014003512 |
| Número de Cutter |
C597f |
In June 2013, the Afghan Taliban opened a political office in Qatar to facilitate peace talks with the U.S. and Afghan governments. Negotiations between the United States and the group that sheltered al-Qaeda would have been unthinkable 12 years ago, but the reality is that a negotiated settlement in Afghanistan is one of several possible end games under the current U.S. withdrawal plan. Negotiating an end to an insurgency can be a long and arduous process beset by false starts and continued violence, but a comprehensive review of historical cases that ended in settlement shows that these negotiations followed a similar path that can be generalized into a "master narrative." This research examines 13 historical cases of insurgencies that were resolved through negotiated settlement in which neither side (insurgents or counterinsurgents) unambiguously prevailed. Taken together, these cases reveal that the path to negotiated settlement generally proceeds in seven steps in a common sequence. Although this resulting master narrative does not necessarily conform precisely to every conflict brought to resolution through negotiation, it can serve as an important tool to guide the progress of a similar approach to resolving the conflict in Afghanistan as U.S. forces prepare to withdraw.