Corruption, inequality and fairness
Edición de la obra Corruption, inequality and fairness
| Autor | Alberto Alesina |
|---|---|
| Editorial | Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Dept. of Economics |
| Fecha de publicación | 2005 |
| Lugar | Cambridge, MA |
| Idioma | inglés |
| Páginas | 24 |
| OCLC | 60569779 |
| Serie | Working paper series / Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Dept. of Economics -- working paper 05-16 · Working paper (Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Dept. of Economics) -- no. 05-16. |
| Número de Cutter | A371c |
Bigger governments raise the possibilities for corruption; more corruption may in turn raise the support for redistributive policies that intend to correct the inequality and injustice generated by corruption. We formalize these insights in a simple dynamic model. A positive feedback from past to current levels of taxation and corruption arises either when wealth originating in corruption and rent seeking is considered unfair, or when the ability to engage in corruption is unevenly distributed in the population. This feedback introduces persistence in the size of the government and the levels of corruption and inequality. Multiple steady states exist in some cases. Keywords: Corruption, rent seeking, inequality, fairness, redistribution, political economy. JEL Classifications: D31, E62, H2, P16.