Contracts as reference points
Edición de la obra Contracts as reference points
| Autor | Oliver Hart |
|---|---|
| Editorial | National Bureau of Economic Research |
| Fecha de publicación | 2006 |
| Lugar | Cambridge, MA |
| Idioma | inglés |
| Formato | [electronic resource] / |
| LCCN | 2006619669 |
| Serie | NBER working paper series -- working paper 12706 · Working paper series (National Bureau of Economic Research : Online) -- working paper no. 12706. |
| Número de Cutter | H326c |
"We argue that a contract provides a reference point for a trading relationship: more precisely, for parties' feelings of entitlement. A party's ex post performance depends on whether he gets what he is entitled to relative to outcomes permitted by the contract. A party who is shortchanged shades on performance. A flexible contract allows parties to adjust their outcome to uncertainty, but causes inefficient shading. Our analysis provides a basis for long-term contracts in the absence of noncontractible investments, and elucidates why “employment” contracts, which fix wage in advance and allow the employer to choose the task, can be optimal"--John M. Olin Center for Law, Economics, and Business web site.