The Theory of Knowledge in Pragmatic Perspective
Edición de la obra Cognitive Pragmatism
| Autor | Rescher, Nicholas. |
|---|---|
| Editorial | University of Pittsburgh Press |
| Fecha de publicación | August 16, 2001 |
| Idioma | inglés |
| Páginas | 264 |
| Formato | Hardcover |
| ISBN-13 | 9780822941538 |
| ISBN-10 | 0822941538 |
| OCLC | 46937432 |
| LCCN | 2001002730 |
| Número de Cutter | R431c |
Nicholas Rescher tackles the major questions of philosophical inquiry, pondering the nature of truth and existence. Rescher argues that the development of knowledge is a practice, pursued by humans because we have a need for its products. This pragmatic approach satisfies our innate urge as humans to make sense of our surroundings. Taking his discussion down to the level of particular details, and addressing such topics as inductive validation, hypostatization fallacies, and counterfactual reasoning, Rescher abandons abstract generalities in favor of concrete specifics. For example, philosophers usually insist that to reason logically from a counterfactual, we must imagine a possible world in which the statement is fact. But Rescher argues that there's no need to attempt to accept the facts of a world outside our cognition in order to reason from them. He shows us how we can use our own natural system of prioritizing to resolve the inconsistencies in such statements as, "If the Eiffel Tower were in Manhattan, then it would be in New York State." In using dozens of real-world examples such as these Rescher casts light on a wide variety of concrete issues in the classical theory of knowledge, and reassures us along the way that the inherent limitations on our knowledge are no cause for distress. In pragmatic theory and inquiry, we must accept that the best we can do is good enough, because we only have a certain (albeit large) set of tools and conceptualizations available to us.