Steven Shavell1946 · 110 obras en el catálogoObras — página 2OOptimal sanctions and the incentive to provide evidence to lOptimal sanctions and the incentive to provide evidence to legal tribunalsTThe optimal structure of law enforcementThe optimal structure of law enforcementTThe optimal use of nonmonetary sanctions as a deterrentThe optimal use of nonmonetary sanctions as a deterrentSSharing of information prior to settlement or litigationSharing of information prior to settlement or litigationSSpecific versus general enforcement of lawSpecific versus general enforcement of lawSSuit versus settlement when parties seek nonmonetary judgmenSuit versus settlement when parties seek nonmonetary judgmentsAAlternative dispute resolutionAlternative dispute resolutionAAny frequency of plaintiff victory at trial is possibleAny frequency of plaintiff victory at trial is possibleTThe appeals process as a means of error correctionThe appeals process as a means of error correctionTThe optimal level of corporate liability given the limited aThe optimal level of corporate liability given the limited ability of corporations to penalize their employeesAAn economic analysis of tort lawAn economic analysis of tort lawAA note on the incentive to reveal informationA note on the incentive to reveal informationMMinimum asset requirementsMinimum asset requirementsEEconomic analysis of accident lawEconomic analysis of accident lawEEconomic analysis of property lawEconomic analysis of property lawEEconomic analysis of contract lawEconomic analysis of contract lawEEconomic analysis of litigation and the legal processEconomic analysis of litigation and the legal processEEconomic analysis of public law enforcement and criminal lawEconomic analysis of public law enforcement and criminal lawEEconomic analysis of the general structure of the lawEconomic analysis of the general structure of the lawWWelfare economics, morality, and the lawWelfare economics, morality, and the lawOOn the writing and the interpretation of contractsOn the writing and the interpretation of contractsMMinimum asset requirements and compulsory liability insurancMinimum asset requirements and compulsory liability insurance as solutions to the judgment-proof problemLLaw versus morality as regulators of conductLaw versus morality as regulators of conductTThe appeals process and adjudicator incentivesThe appeals process and adjudicator incentives AnteriorPágina 2 de 5Siguiente
OOptimal sanctions and the incentive to provide evidence to lOptimal sanctions and the incentive to provide evidence to legal tribunals
TThe optimal use of nonmonetary sanctions as a deterrentThe optimal use of nonmonetary sanctions as a deterrent
SSharing of information prior to settlement or litigationSharing of information prior to settlement or litigation
SSuit versus settlement when parties seek nonmonetary judgmenSuit versus settlement when parties seek nonmonetary judgments
AAny frequency of plaintiff victory at trial is possibleAny frequency of plaintiff victory at trial is possible
TThe appeals process as a means of error correctionThe appeals process as a means of error correction
TThe optimal level of corporate liability given the limited aThe optimal level of corporate liability given the limited ability of corporations to penalize their employees
EEconomic analysis of litigation and the legal processEconomic analysis of litigation and the legal process
EEconomic analysis of public law enforcement and criminal lawEconomic analysis of public law enforcement and criminal law
EEconomic analysis of the general structure of the lawEconomic analysis of the general structure of the law
OOn the writing and the interpretation of contractsOn the writing and the interpretation of contracts
MMinimum asset requirements and compulsory liability insurancMinimum asset requirements and compulsory liability insurance as solutions to the judgment-proof problem