Drew Fudenberg

1957 · 37 obras en el catálogo

Professor of economics at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology.

Obras

The folk theorem in repeated games with discounting and with incomplete information

Sequential bargaining with many buyers

Predation without reputation

Finite player approximations to a continuum of players

On the robustness of equilibrium refinements

Reputation and equilibrium selection in games with a patient player

On the dispensability of public randomization in discounted repeated games

Reputation in the simultaneous play of multiple opponents

Short-term contracts and long-term agency relationships

Reputation, unobserved strategies, and active supermartingales

Nash and perfect equilibria of discounted repeated games

Perfect Bayesian and sequential equilibria

Moral hazard and renegotiation in agency contracts

Monopoly and credibility in asset markets

An approximate folk theorem with imperfect private information

Self-confirming equilibrium

Learning mixed equilibria

Repeated games with long-run and short-run players

Steady state learning and Nash equilibrium

Equilibrium payoffs with long-run and short-run players and imperfect public information

The Folk Theorem with imperfect public information

Maintaining a reputation when strategies are imperfectly observed

Efficiency and observability with long-run and short-run players

Explaining cooperation and commitment in repeated games